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I V 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee believes that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal as it is untimely. Burgers 
v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).; U-MInvestments, v. Ray, 658 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Any determinative constitutional provisions, statutes or rules are reproduced herein in 
addendum "B". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action commenced with the filing of a Complaint on June 19, 1998. R.l. The 
Complaint was filed by the Plaintiff Pro Se. R.l. It is not clear from the file when the Complaint 
was served on the Defendant, as there is no copy of the served summons in the court's file. 
An Answer and Counterclaim were filed by the Defendant on July 1, 1998. R.13. 
Even though a possession bond was placed with the court, the Defendant through requesting 
various hearings managed to hold over in the property until August 16, 1998. R.10, T.99. The 
Defendant filed an Answer, a Counterclaim and Request for Hearing on the possession bond request. 
R.13, R.38. The hearing was scheduled for August 3, 1998. R.38. 
At that hearing, Plaintiff was first represented by counsel Shawn D. Turner, and the law firm 
f Larson, Turner, Fairbanks. & Dalby.' A second hearing was scheduled on August 5, 1998. R.46. o 
The firm was at that time called Larson. Kirkham and Turner. 
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At that hearing, counsel for the Defendant made claims contrary to the previous order of Judge 
Hilder, and consequently the matter was returned to Judge Hilder for a final determination. R.48. 
After Plaintiffs counsel had made his appearance, Defendant's counsel purportedly mailed 
the Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents, and Request for 
Admissions to the Plaintiff. R.50. Plaintiff claims he never received any such pleadings, which, if 
sent, were sent to him in violation of both Utah Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The very first item actually received, from the Defendant, by Plaintiffs counsel was a Notice 
to Submit for Decision, dated the 16* day of September, 1998. R.76. On October 5,1998, a Motion 
for Order Establishing Admissions was sent to Plaintiffs counsel. R.95. Plaintiff objected to the 
motion on the bas1S that he had never received the Request for Admissions, and further hadn't been 
able to see the certificate of mailing as the court's file was unavailable when Plaintiffs counsel went 
to the court. R. 136-138. 
On November 10. 1998. Judge Hilder scheduled a hearing to address the issue of the Request 
for Admissions. At the hearing, the court found that Plaintiffs counsel had never received copies 
of the discovery requests, but stated that it felt that under the Langeland v Monarch Motors, Inc. 
case, the court was nevertheless required to deem the requests for admissions to be admitted. 
Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998). 
Defendant has failed to obtain a transcript of that hearing to be included as part of this record, 
failing in his duty to marshall the evidence. Following the initial hearing, the court asked for 
additional briefing on the issue, particularly on the Langelcmd case. In the Plaintiffs response, the 
Plaintiff clearly presented the alternative to the court of an amendment or withdrawal of his request 
for admissions under Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R.209. Notwithstanding the 
Plaintiffs objections, the court felt that Langelcmd required the request for admissions to be deemed 
admitted. 
Trial was held in this matter on March 22, 1999, before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder. 
Prior to the commencement of the trial, Judge Hilder informed counsel of the respective parties, that 
he was not going to allow the Defendant to perpetrate a fraud on the court. He informed the parties 
that he would allow evidence as to certain documentary evidence that would be submitted at trial to 
determine whether the documents included alterations or forgeries. T.3-4. 
After hearing the witnesses and determining their credibility, the court entered a ruling from 
the bench, finding in favor of the Plaintiff on his Complaint and in favor of the Defendant on his 
Counterclaim in some aspects. Counsel for the Plaintiff was ordered by the court to prepare a draft 
order, findings of fact and conclusions of law. The documents were instead submitted by the 
Defendants and said findings were objected to by the Plaintiff. R.312. R.330. The court examined 
the respective filings of the parties and their various objections and entered a minute entry setting 
forth the court"s findings of fact and conclusions of law on September 14. 1999. R.422. 
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Without waiting for the judgment to be signed, the Defendant filed a Rule 59 Motion. R.428. 
The initial judgment was signed on October 21, 1999. R.466. 
The Defendant then filed a second Rule 59 Motion on November 3, 1999. The Rule 59 
Motion of the Defendant was granted in part and was denied in part by a minute entry and order 
which is undated but was completed at some point in May 2000. R.494. The minute entry informed 
the parties that the judgment would be amended to take into account a SI50.00 credit for the 
Defendant. 
On June 7. 2000. the Notice of Appeal was filed in this case. R.497. 
On June 19, 2000. the Amended Judgment was actually signed by the court and entered. 
R.499. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. At the inception of this proceeding Mr. Hawkins was the owner of certain real 
property located at 61 West Russett Salt Lake City, Utah. T.20. 
2. During the period of Mr. Hawkins ownership he leased rooms of the home located 
on the property to various tenants. T.21. 
3. Mr. Hawkins had a standard form lease agreement which he used with a majority of 
the tenants in the property. T.32. 
4. Initially Mr. Hawkins himself lived in the home and occupied one of the rooms. 
T.21. 
5. On or about June 21, 1997 Mr. Hawkins entered into a lease agreement with the 
Defendant, Tom Callahan. T.23. 
6. The lease provided that it was to be operational from July 15, 1997 until March 15, 
1998. T.25. 
7. Mr. Callahan took the original lease and refused to give Mr. Hawkins a copy thereof. 
T.24. 
8. Under the terms of the lease Mr. Callahan was to provide a deposit of $200.00 and 
was to pay a monthly rent of $290.00. Plaintiffs Exhibit #1. 
9. Mr. Callahan paid $50.00 but never provided the other $150.00. T.24. 
10. At the time Mr. Callahan and Mr. Hawkins entered into the lease, Mr. Callahan had 
asked for a longer term lease. T.29-30. 
11. Mr. Hawkins had declined to give Mr. Callahan a longer term lease and informed him 
that it was his belief he would be selling the property so that he could go to nursing school. T.30. 
12. Shortly after Mr. Callahan occupied the premises Mr. Callahan would present Mr. 
Hawkins with 3 x 5 cards to act as receipts for the payment of Mr. Callahan's rent. T.34-35. 
13. Mr. Hawkins would sign those receipts. T.35. 
14. Pursuant to the terms of the lease, at the expiration of the lease period the 
arrangement between the parties was one of a month to month tenancy. Plaintiffs Exhibit #1. 
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15. Towards the end of April of 1998 Mr. Hawkins gave Mr. Callahan a 30 Day Notice 
to Quit in order to terminate the month to month tenancy. Plaintiffs Exhibit #5 
16. The notice was given on the basis that the lease between the parties had expired and 
it was Mr. Hawkins desire to prepare the home for sale consistent with his intentions that he 
expressed to Mr. Callahan the previous June. Plaintiffs Exhibit #5 
17. Mr. Callahan indicated that he would leave the property but that he needed time to 
find a new place. T.39 
18. Mr. Callahan made no mention of having an additional period of time to stay in the 
property pursuant to any extension of the lease agreement. T.39. 
19. On two or three separate occasions the Defendant assaulted and threatened Mr. 
Hawkins and/or his girlfriend who was on the premises on behalf of Mr. Hawkins. T.40-42. 
20. On or about June 15, 1998 Mr. Hawkins served two notices to quit on Mr. Callahan. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit #6 & #7; T.42-46. 
21. One of the notices was for failure to pay the full amount due and in particular the 
balance of the deposit, being $150.00. The second Notice to Quit was for violating the rules of the 
lease including smoking in the house, failing to keep the living areas clean, and threatening the 
landlord. Plaintiffs Exhibit #6 & #7. 
22. Callahan did not remedy any of the defaults in either of the notices and further did 
not vacate the premises. 
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23. Thereafter this action was filed. R. 1. 
24. After this action was filed a document purporting to be an extension of the lease 
between the parties was produced as part of the Defendant's pleadings. Plaintiffs Exhibit #4. 
25. The document was a copy of a 3x5 card that Mr. Hawkins had signed acknowledging 
receipt of a rental payment. T.36-37. 
26. The document was subsequently altered by the Defendant to add in the language 
purporting to give the defendant an extension of time to stay in the property for another full year. 
R.423. 
27. The Defendant remained in the property up through and including August 15, 1998 
although he had not paid rent for the months of July or August. T.99. 
28. Contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendant after receiving notice of the 
appearance of Plaintiff s counsel, allegedly mailed discovery requests directly to the Plaintiff and 
not to Plaintiffs counsel. R.50. 
29. Although the discovery was never sent to Plaintiffs counsel and Plaintiffs counsel 
had never seen the same, the court upheld the Defendant's Motion Establishing Admissions. R.194. 
30. The Defendant's filed two Rule 59 Motions, one prior to the entry of judgment and 
one thirteen days thereafter. R.428, R.469. The Rule 59 Motion was denied in part and granted in 
part by minute entry. R.494-496. 
31. The Notice of Appeal in this case was filed on June 7. 2000. R.497. 
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32. The final judgment in this case, comprising the amended judgment was filed on June 
19, 2000. R.49. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This action began as a simple attempt by the Plaintiff to regain control of his property and 
ended up being a three ring circus of the Defendant attempting to defraud the court, with the case 
itself being churned for attorney's fees. It is no coincidence that the single greatest element of 
"damages" claimed by the Defendant in this case are his attorney's fees. It is likewise not a 
coincidence that the Defendant proclaimed himself'impecunious" and judgment proof. 
Before getting to the "merits" of the Defendant's appeal, the Defendant would have to clear 
two hurdles which are fatal to the current action. 
The first problem is that this Court has no jurisdiction to even address the appeal. Rule 4(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the 
trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 
3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within thirty days after 
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However, 
when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall 
be filed with the clerk of the trial court within ten days of the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
U.R.A.P. Rule 4(a). 
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This is an unlawful detainer action and therefore, according to the Rule, the Notice of Appeal 
needed to be filed within ten days of the date of judgment. The initial judgment in this action was 
filed on October 21, 1999. R.466. The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 7, 2000. R.497. 
The time for filing the Notice of Appeal is stayed when a timely motion under Rule 59 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is made. In that event, the Notice of Appeal is to be filed at the 
conclusion of the post-judgment ruling. 
The Defendant's first problem is that his Rule 59 Motions were not filed timely. The 
Defendant filed two Rule 59 Motions. The first, contrary to the express language of the rule, was 
filed before the entry of the judgment. R.428; R.466. The second, contrary to the rule, was filed 
thirteen days after the judgment. R.419. Even if the motion had been timely, the Notice of Appeal 
is still not. 
The Defendant's motion, under Rule 59, was made and granted in part and denied in part. 
The result was the court entered an amended judgment on June 19, 2000. R.499. Appellant's Notice 
of Appeal was filed twelve days prior to the entry of the Judgment which he is attempting to appeal 
from. Where the Notice of Appeal is filed prior to the final disposition of the post-judgment motion, 
it is of no affect. U-M Investments v. Ray, 658 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982); Anderson v. Schwendiman, 
764 P.2d 999 (Utah App. 1988). The failure of the Defendant to refile his Notice of Appeal after the 
entry of the Amended Judgment, leaves this Court without jurisdiction and is fatal to Defendant's 
claims. 
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The next procedural hurdle that the Defendant would need to overcome in this appeal, is his 
failure to marshall the evidence. This matter comes before the Court on appeal from a bench trial 
wherein the court entered specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. To successfully challenge 
the trial court's finding, the Defendant must demonstrate that the findings are clearly erroneous. To 
make such a showing, the Defendant must marshall all of the evidence supporting the finding, and 
then demonstrate how this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, is 
insufficient to support it. Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172. 1177 (Utah App. 1995). Not only has 
the Defendant failed to marshall all of the evidence and analyze why it does not meet this minimal 
standard required, but the Defendant has failed to even order the necessary transcripts to marshall 
the evidence. In addition to the trial, there were three separate hearings held in this case. Not one 
of these transcripts has been ordered by the Defendant. One of those hearings specifically dealt with 
the issues relating to the Request for Admissions, which issue is the predominant issue included in 
the Defendant's Brief. Due to the Defendant's failure to marshall the evidence, this Court should not 
disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Beesley v Harris, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994) 
If this Court determines to go on and address the merits of the Defendant's appeal, it will find 
that those merits are sorely lacking. Defendant's initial arguments are that the trial court made a 
mistake by not allowing the Defendant to defraud the court. In both its original judgment and in the 
minute entry rejecting in large part the Rule 59 Motion of the Defendant, the court made specific-
findings as to the total lack of credibility of the Defendant. The court specifically stated that it was 
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not going to allow the Defendant to subserve the presentation of the merits of the case through some 
sort of procedural chicanery. 
The court's ruling on the documentary evidence and allowing that evidence at trial is more 
than supported both in case law and by statute. Indeed, the only error the court made was in 
originally granting the motion to have the admissions deemed admitted. R.494. 
Because service of the Request was not done appropriately, the Defendant's Motion 
shouldn't have been granted at all and all of the benefits he derived from that in the trial would have 
been more appropriately stricken. Rather than providing the Defendant a basis for appeal, the court's 
ruling actually would have provided the grounds for appeal by the Plaintiff. Once you get past the 
issue of the Request for Admissions, the determination to the remaining issues is simply a matter 
of credibility. "The trial court is in the best position to weigh conflicting testimony, to assess 
credibility, and from this, to make findings of fact/* Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Utah 
App. 1995). Although not referred to in Appellant's Brief, there was direct testimony from both 
Plaintiff and Defendant with respect to whether the documents at issue had been altered. The trial 
court found that the Defendant totally lacked credibility. The court's ruling was based in large part 
on that determination. In addition to the testimony of the parties, the Plaintiff was able to show other 
lease documents that didn't contain the provisions that had been hand-written into the lease at 
question in this case. The additional hand-written additions were all in the hand-writing of the 
Defendant. The testimony from third party witnesses went to specific elements such as the provision 
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of cable television which was included in the lease proffered up by the Defendant. The direct 
testimony from the Plaintiff Mr. Hawkins and from Mr. Royal Kay, a former resident of the home, 
was that there had never been any cable television at the home in Mr. Hawkins' name. 
Both the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses were clearly in favor of 
the Plaintiff in this action. The Defendant's appeal must therefore be denied and Plaintiff should be 
awarded his costs and attorney's fees in responding to this appeal pursuant to the attorney's fees 
clause in the lease between the parties. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS Court LACKS JURISDICTION TO 
HEAR DEFENDANT'S APPEAL. 
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional. State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah App. 
1991). The rules regarding the timing of such filings are clearly set forth in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. This is an action brought under the Utah Unlawful Detainer Statutes. 
Pursuant to Rule 4(a), the Notice of Appeal in such an action is required to be filed with the clerk 
of the trial court within ten days after the date of entry of the Judgment. That Rule is somewhat 
modified by subpart (b) of Rule 4. This subsection provides in pertinent part: 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in 
the trial court by any party ... (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment... the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry 
of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such 
motion. Similarly ... a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the 
12 
entry of the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as 
provided above. 
U.R.A.P. Rule 4(b). 
In the present case, the initial Judgment was filed on October 21, 1999. R.466. The 
Defendant had filed a premature Rule 59 Motion to amend on September 24, 1999, prior to the entry 
of the Judgment. R.428. A second Rule 59 Motion to Amend was filed on November 3, 1999. The 
plain language of Rule 59 requires that the motion be served %tnot later than ten days after the entry 
of the Judgment." Under the plain language of the Rule therefore, the initial Rule 59 Motion to 
Amend filed on September 24, 1999, was untimely and could not toll the time to file a Notice of 
Appeal. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). 
After entry of the Judgment on October 21, 1999, a second Rule 59 Motion to Amend was 
filed. R.469.2 Although this Rule 59 Motion is purportedly dated October 27, 1999, the document 
was not in actuality filed with the court until November 3, 1999. R.469. Since the Judgment was 
filed on October 21,1999, the Rule 59 Motion needed to filed by October 31, 1999. October 31 st 
was a Sunday which would allow Defendant until November 1, 1999. The Motion was not filed 
until November 3, 1999, making it untimely. The result is again that the untimely Motion failed to 
toll the time period for filing a Notice of Appeal, which in a unlawful detainer action like the one 
at present means the time for filing the Notice of Appeal likewise expired on November 1, 1999. 
The Motion was apparently in response to Plaintiffs First Memorandum in opposition to the initial Rule 
59 Motion, where it was pointed out that the Motion was untimely. R.448. 
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The Notice of Appeal in this case was actually filed on June 7, 2000. R.497. In light of the 
untimely filing of the Notice of Appeal, this Court has no jurisdiction over the appeal and it must 
be dismissed. 
Even had the Rule 59 Motions been timely filed, the Notice of Appeal is still untimely. The 
untimely Rule 59 Motion was granted in part and denied in part. The result of the partial grant of 
the Motion resulted in the court filing an Amended Judgment. R.499. An Amended Judgment would 
be the final judgment in this case. It would be the order disposing of the Rule 59 Motion. Rule 4(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides in pertinent part, "a Notice of Appeal filed before 
the disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new Notice of Appeal must be 
filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial court disposing of 
the motion as provided above." This very issue was addressed by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of U-MInvestments v Ray, 658 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982). The issue in that case was whether an 
appeal filed before the final disposition of a Rule 59 Motion provided jurisdiction for the Appellate 
Court to hear an appeal. The Utah Supreme Court clearly stated: 
After the motions were made by the defendants, both groups filed a 
notice of appeal from the September judgment. Had no motions been 
filed under Rule 59 within ten days of the judgment, such notice of 
appeal clearly would have been timely. However, under Rule 73(a) 
the timely motions filed to upset the judgment render the notice of 
appeal ineffective. The time for appeal therefore automatically was 
rescheduled, and an appeal then had to be taken within one month of 
the date of the register of actions entry that denied defendant's 
motions or amended the judgment. 
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U-M Investments v. Ray, at 1187. 
There are two possible results out of a Rule 59 Motion. Either it is denied, which triggers 
time for filing the appeal, or it is granted, and if it is granted, then the filing of the Amended 
Judgment is the event that triggers the time frame for filing an appeal. The sort of preliminary ruling 
by the court announcing an Amended Judgment would be filed is not a final Judgment triggering the 
time for appeal. See Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah App. 1988). Accordingly, even 
if the Defendant had in some fashion filed a timely Motion under Rule 59, the premature filing of 
the Notice of Appeal before the entry of the Amended Judgment in this case makes the notice 
ineffective. This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the appeal and it must be dismissed. 
II. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DENIED DUE TO 
HIS FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE. 
The Defendant seeks to challenge findings of the trial court that the lease agreement between 
the parties and a purported extension of that lease were documents which had been fraudulently 
altered by the Defendant. In order meet this burden, the Defendant must show that the finding of 
the trial court is "clearly erroneous." Fisher v. Fisher. 907 P.2d 1172, 1178 (Utah App. 1995). In 
Fisher, this Court clearly set forth the duties and burdens of a party seeking to demonstrate that the 
trial court's findings were clearly erroneous. This Court stated: 
To successfully challenge the trial court's finding, the trust must 
demonstrate that finding is clearly erroneous. To make such a 
showing the trust must marshall all of the evidence supporting the 
finding and then demonstrate how this evidence, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the finding, is insufficient to support it. 
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Fisher, at 1177. The Defendant has clearly failed in that burden in this case. Rather than citing to 
the evidence supporting the court's ruling, the Defendant provides his own narration as to the facts 
that he presented at trial. It is not in any fashion an attempt to marshall the evidence and examine 
the items that the court would have ruled on. This is the exact situation this Court addressed in the 
Fisher case. This Court held: 
Rather than marshall the evidence, the trust merely highlights a 
portion of the trial court's findings and then argues that there was 
other, contrary evidence before the trial court... 
The trial court is in the best position to weigh conflicting testimony, 
to assess credibility, and from this, to make findings of fact. This 
Court does not lightly disturb the factual findings of a trial court. 
Accordingly, absenta proper showing that the trial court erred, we 
will not revisit the facts on appeal. 
Fisher, at 1178 (citations omitted). 
Not only has the Defendant failed to marshall the e\ idence presented at trial, he has likewise 
failed to even obtain transcripts of the prior hearings held in this case. One of those hearings was 
specifically held on the issue of the Request for Admissions which form the central portion of the 
Defendant's appeal. In light of the Defendant's failure to marshall the e\ idence, the court must 
presume that the evidence presented to the court was sufficient to sustain the court's mling and deny 
the Defendant's appeal. 
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III. THE COURT PROPERLY PREVENTED THE DEFENDANT 
FROM PERPETRATING A FRAUD ON THE COURT. 
A. The Request for Admissions was not properly served. 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part, "whenever under these 
rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the 
service shall be made upon the attorney, unless the service upon the parties is ordered by the court." 
U.R.C.P. Rule 5(b)(1). Counsel first appeared for the Plaintiff at the hearing in this matter on 
August 3, 1998. That appearance is reflected on the docket. R.48. 
On August 14, 1998, in direct contravention of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Defendant 
alleges that he mailed a copy of his discovery request directly to the Plaintiff and not to Plaintiffs 
counsel. R.50. The Plaintiff claims that he never received such discovery. Plaintiffs counsel 
certainly never received such discovery until a Motion for Order Compelling discovery and Motion 
for Order Establishing Admissions were sent on or about October 5, 1998. Plaintiffs counsel went 
to the court to review the file on three separate occasions, after receiving Defendant's motion, to 
examine the file in this case. Each time he was told the file was not available. Plaintiffs counsel 
was left therefore unable to determine that the discovery had allegedly inappropriately been sent to 
his client, because he never saw the mailing certificate. R.137. That document was never directly 
provided to Plaintiffs counsel by the Defendant or his counsel. 
The reason is obvious. The document shows that service was not appropriately made. 
Because the alleged service of the discovery was inappropriate, the trial court's initial order granting 
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the Motion to have the items deemed admitted was improper. The court's subsequent decision 
therefore to allow limited testimony to the effect relating to areas where the Defendant was 
attempting to perpetrate a fraud on the court, while not going far enough, clearly remedied at least 
some of its deficiency. 
B. The Court's Decision to Grant the Motion 
Deeming the Admissions Admitted Without 
Proper Service was Improper. 
In determining whether the Request for Admissions in this case should be admitted, the court 
examined three cases: Langelandv Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998); Jensen v 
Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 1985); and, Whittaker v. Nikols, 699 P.2d 685 (Utah 
1985). All three of these cases provided examples where the court found that Request for 
Admissions should be deemed admitted. All of these cases share one thing in common, there was 
no dispute in any of the cases that the Request for Admissions were actually sent to the other party 
in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure, or that the other party had received them. The 
importance of this distinction is clear. If a party has not received disco\ery requests, he has no dutv 
to respond to them. If they have not received them, deeming them admitted is a violation of the due 
process rights of a party against whom the Motion has been filed. 
"Due process is not a technical concept that can be reduced to a formula with a fixed content, 
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. Rather, the demands of due process rests on the concept 
ot basic fairness of procedure and in a manner procedure appropriate to the case and parties 
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involved." In re: Worthed 926 P.2d 853, 877 (Utah 1996). "The test of procedural due process is 
fairness." Wells v. Children \s Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984). The basic 
procedural due process requirements are notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. 
By deeming the admissions in this case to be admitted, the trial court subserved the 
fundamental and basic rights incorporated in procedural due process. In the hearing, the court stated 
that it accepted the fact that Plaintiffs counsel had never received the Request for Admissions from 
the Defendant. The mailing certificate demonstrates that they were never sent to Plaintiffs counsel 
and instead were at best improperly sent to the Plaintiff himself. In keeping within the constitutional 
requirements of due process, therefore, the court could not and should not have deemed the Request 
for Admissions to be admitted. The court's determination to at least allow limited testimony on 
issues where fraud was to be attempted on the court, to some degree ameliorated this prior erroneous 
ruling. 
C. The Court's Modification of its Prior Ruling 
was at Least a Partial Response to 
Plaintiffs Rule 36(b) Motion. 
Under Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it provides that the "court may permit 
withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby 
and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court, the withdrawal or amendment 
will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.** While the Defendant 
proclaims that the court's decision to allow evidence that could show the attempt by the Defendant 
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to perpetrate a fraud on the court in some fashion prejudiced him. there is not a single concrete 
example of such prejudice. 
Defendant failed to identify a single exhibit or a single witness that could have been 
presented to the court, outside of those that were already presented. Indeed, it is impossible to 
foresee any such circumstances that could have arisen. The documents at issue were executed solely 
between the Plaintiff and Defendant. No other parties were present when the documents were 
executed. The documents themselves were presented to the court. There is no allegation other than 
the documents presented to the court that there were any extrinsic documents that could have been 
used to evaluate the authenticity of the various documents. The trial court took all of the evidence 
and listened to all of the evidence before determining what was relevant and what should be admitted 
for purposes of trial. The court found specifically that the Defendant had altered documents which 
he tried to present to the court as if they were originals. T.163. 
In Defendant's Brief, they allege that no Rule 36 Motion was ever made. That is simply not 
true. 
In Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854 P.2d 555 (Utah App. 1993). this Court found that documents 
ser\ed in opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment which addressed the attempt to have the 
Request for Admissions deemed admitted constituted a Motion for Withdrawal, even thoush the 
pleadings were not captioned or titled the same. Brunetti, at 558. In this case, the Plaintiff had filed 
an objection to the Defendant's Motion for Order Compelling Discovery. That Motion could have 
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been treated by the court as a Motion to Withdraw the Request for Admissions. In the Supplemental 
Memorandum in Response to Request for Admissions be Deemed Admitted filed by the Plaintiff, 
the court's option to treat the prior objection as a Motion to Withdraw was pointed out together with 
a more formal presentation of the same request. R.210. Attached to the Plaintiffs Memorandum 
were copies of the sworn Answer to the Request for Admissions and an Affidavit of the Plaintiff, 
setting forth the objections made in the Request for Admissions. The courts specific findings with 
respect to the forged documents clearly shows that presentation of the evidence in this case would 
have been subserved had the court not stepped in and modified its ruling.3 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "a trial court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from the final judgment, order, or 
proceeding where there has been fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party/' 
U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b). The Rule also specifically states that ''this Rule does not limit the power of 
the court to entertain independent action to relieve a party from a judgment order or proceeding, or 
to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." Id. The court specifically found that the 
Defendant in this action was trying to perpetrate a fraud upon the court. It was clearly within the 
court's power to prevent such an event from taking place. 
J
 This meets the requirements set forth in Langelancl, that the parties seeking withdrawal or amendment of 
the Request for Admissions must show that the presentation of the merits of the action would be served, show that the 
matters deemed admitted a2ainst it are relevant to the merits of the underlving cause of action and must introduce some 
evidence by affidavit or otherwise that the specific facts indicating the matters deemed admitted against it are in fact 
untrue. 
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The court's ruling, while Plaintiff believes the court did not go far enough, at least 
ameliorated to some extent the trial court's original erroneous ruling deeming the Request for 
Admissions be admitted. 
IV. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW AN 
ATTEMPT OF FRAUD UPON THE COURT. 
The court specifically found that two documents presented at trial had been altered by the 
Defendant from the original state that they had been in at the time Plaintiff signed those documents. 
The documents were the original lease agreement between the parties and a document 
purporting to be an extension of that lease. As set forth in section II. above, it was the duty of the 
Defendant in this case to marshall all of the evidence supporting the court's ruling, and to show why 
that evidence could not support the court's finding. He has failed to do that. It was this Court that 
stated in Fisher v. Fisher that '"the trial court is in the best position to weigh conflicting testimony, 
to assess credibility, and from this, make findings of fact/' Fisher, at 1178. In this case, the court 
made the following specific finding with respect to the lease agreement and the credibility of the 
witnesses: 
I am first going to address the issue of the admissions, most of which 
I am continuing to deem admitted, with the exception of those 
admissions that go to the issue of a so-called extension of the lease or 
the lease terms. 
I find Mr. Callahan to be a not credible witness overall. I find it 
difficult to believe his testimony for a number of reasons. I find it to 
be inconsistent and self-serving, and I find that he did in fact alter the 
lease after it was signed b\ the parties. 
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I therefore, find ~ I also find that the card that allegedly extended the 
lease was not prepared and signed in its form, as presented to the 
court, by Mr. Hawkins. Therefore, there was no extension of lease 
past March 15, 1998. 
T.163. 
The court reiterated its position at the time that it addressed the Defendant's Rule 59 Motion. In its 
minute entry, the court stated: 
The court has carefully considered the Motion and Response. With 
respect to the Request for Admissions, that issue is squarely before 
the court on the date of trial, and the court denies Defendant's Motion 
to Amend. The court recalls, and review of the video tape confirms, 
that at the outset of trial, the court indicated that admittedly on its 
own motion (and alerted to the possibility by Plaintiffs Trial Brief), 
that it would revisit the Request for Admissions, particularly the one 
regarding in the purported lease extension, if it appeared that the 
extension was a result of fraud or forgery. That is exactly what the 
court found. 
Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998), 
notwithstanding, this court does not that Rule 36, U.R.C.P.. robs this 
court of its inherent power to prevent injustice, and particularly the 
power to prevent the use of a court rule, or litigation device, to 
perpetrate a fraud on the court or on a party. The court explicitly 
found that the Defendant was not credible on the issue of the lease 
extension. The court is aware that the Defendant believes that the 
evidence does not support this finding, but as fact the court was 
unequivocally persuaded that the finder "extension" was bogus and 
any dispute with that finding is a matter for appeal. 
R.494. 
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A. Evidence Relating to the Lease. 
The following evidence was presented by the Plaintiff in support of his contention that the 
lease agreement between the parties had been altered. Beginning with page 23 of the transcript, Mr. 
Hawkins testified that Plaintiffs Exhibit #1 was a copy of the lease agreement that he had entered 
into with Mr. Callahan. Mr. Hawkins went on to testify that he did not have the original of the 
document and in fact, did not have a copy of the document until litigation had begun because the 
Defendant had kept the original and had refused to return it to him. T.24. Mr. Hawkins then went 
on to specifically identify the items on the lease agreement that were in his hand-writing versus that 
of the Defendant. T.25-26. 
Mr. Hawkins then went on to testify that a large number of the items that were set forth on 
Exhibit # 1, were not on there at time he signed the agreement. T.26-31. 
Plaintiff then introduced Exhibits #2 & #3. These documents were other leases that were 
signed in a contemporaneous period with other individuals who were leasing from Mr. Hawkins. 
T.31. Mr. Hawkins testimony was that aside from the fixed terms of the lease, offered to Mr. 
Callahan, the terms and conditions that he offered were exactly the same as those to his other tenants. 
T.43. 
In the brief testimony allowed from Mr. Royal Kay, he testified that contrary to the terms 
purportedly set out in the lease with Mr. Callahan, there was no cable television provided. T.75. 
Mr. Hawkins also testified that he had never had cable television in his name at the home. 
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The court had therefore the direct testimony of the Plaintiff, supporting testimony as to at 
least one feature by an independent third party witness, and additional documentary evidence 
supporting the Plaintiffs view as to the legitimacy of the lease document. 
That direct evidence coupled with the demeanor of the witness, including his other attempts 
to obtain fictional damages on his Counterclaim, was sufficient for the court to determine the 
veracity of the witnesses which was a key factor in determining the Defendant's credibility at this 
point. 
B. Evidence Relating to the So-called Lease Extension. 
Just as the Plaintiff had testified that the lease had been altered, so did he testify that the so-
called lease extension was a fraud. T.36-37. 
Mr. Hawkins had testified that the 3x5 cards consisting of Plaintiff s Exhibit #4 were handed 
to him by Mr. Callahan. Mr. Callahan would have the document prepared and have Mr. Hawkins 
sign it. Mr. Hawkins testified that there had been no conversations with Mr. Callahan regarding an 
extension of the lease until March. This was two months later than the date of the purported lease 
extension. 
Again, the court had before it the parties and the document. The court had other examples 
of the same document prepared by Mr. Callahan. Based on the testimony of the parties and the 
documents before it, the court determined Mr. Callahan's testimony was not credible and that the 
document was a fraud. 
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In light of the court's finding and the evidence presented, there is clearly a reasonable basis 
upon which the court could have made its findings of fact and conclusions of law. This Court 
accordingly should not overturn the trial court's mling with respect to those items and the Judgment 
should be sustained. 
V. DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
At the conclusion of trial, the court found in favor of Mr. Hawkins on his Complaint, and in 
favor of the Defendant on his Counterclaim. It is ironic that the Counterclaim was actually filed 
before the events purportedly comprising the Counterclaim had even taken place. 
The court next went on in a detailed analysis evaluating the fees and costs submitted by each 
party and the objections of the same filed by each side. Based upon those determinations, the court 
awarded attorney's fees to both parties and ordered those fees offset against one another. 
Plaintiff does not believe that Defendant should have been entitled to anything on their 
Counterclaim and therefore should have been denied all attorney's fees. It has been obvious from 
the inception of this action, however, that the Defendant is impecunious and judgment proof. And 
consequently, while a great deal of time and resources could have been spent on filing a cross appeal 
in this action, it would be a waste of resources for the Defendant and the court. 
Defendant's counsel cannot receive payment from Defendant and is seeking to oQ{ those fees 
paid by the Plaintiff. This Court should not award such mercenary behavior. The Defendant's 
request for additional attorney's fees should be denied. Plaintiff should be awarded his fees in 
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responding to this appeal. Although in reality, Plaintiff will never see a dime of those funds as the 
Defendant is judgment proof. 
The Appellant's Brief does not address any of the legal argument set forth in the court's 
detailed entry regarding attorney's fees, and the same together with their factual findings should be 
therefore upheld by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal is simply a waste of the Court's time and the parties' resources. Total legitimate 
claimed damages between the parties are less than $1,000.00 on either side. All the rest of the 
damages involve attorney's fees. The time involved in dealing with this appeal alone goes far 
beyond the value of this case. 
This is a case were the Defendant having been found a blatant liar, now comes to this Court 
seeking to take advantage of his breach of the Rules of Civil Procedure ir order to gain some sort 
of a tactical litigation advantage. That type of behavior cannot and should not be rewarded. 
This appeal is untimely and it is improperly prepared in that it fails to marshall the evidence. 
It fails to state a legitimate basis for appeal and should be summarily dismissed. If either party had 
a legitimate gripe for appeal, it is the Plaintiff. Plaintiff however realizes the futility of obtaining 
more of a Judgment against an impecunious party and does not wish to waste the Court's time or his 
own resources in pursuing that action. 
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Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests that this matter be summarily stricken and the appeal 
of the Defendant denied. 
Dated this 29th day of November, 2000. 
LARSON, TURNER. FAIRBANKS & DALBY 
-? / i 
Shawn D. Turner 
Attorney for Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 29th day of November, 2000 a true and correct copy of Brief of 
Appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Thor B. Roundy 
Attorney for Appellant 
275 East South Temple, Ste. 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
29 
ADDENDUM "A" 
Thor B. Roundy (Bar No. 643 5) 
Attorney for Defendant 
275 East South Temple, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (301) 364-3229 
Facsimile (801) 364-4721 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
John B. Hawkins 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Tom Callahan 
Defendant. 
MAG, 
AMENDED JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 980906136:-
Judge Hilder 
CD 
CO 
*© 
Based on the Court's Minute Entry and Order dated May 25 
2000, Judgment in the above-captioned matter 
follows: 
r^ is herebv y amenaea as 
Plaintiff is awarded judgment against the Defendant in c--
amount of $430.00, consisting of two month's rent 1 p« ^ e -
C,1L i e s s
 tne ceposi: 
in the amount of $150.00. Plaintiff is awarded prejudgement 
interesc on the amount of $140.00 at the rate of 10%
 from J u n e ^ 
^993 and the remaining $290.00 at the rate of m i ^ . _ .
 c 
^ —
iL
^^es^ from 
July 15, 1993, until the date of initial judgement in
 thl-, 
matter. Plaintiff is further awarded ^-r~e..„ =._ 
~" ^"—-/° -~trs anc 
^
c
-
{
~
s l r i
 - h i s m a t t e r i n t h e amount of $1 ,33 0 . 7 -
- ^ e ^QTP>r i -enaanc i n t h i s maccer i s awarded da; 
<-~e a.Tour.: 
of $195. CO on his counterclaim. Defendant is awarded interest at 
the prejudgment rate of 10% from August 16, 1998 until the date 
of the initial judgment. Defendant is also awarded attorneys fees 
and costs in the amount of $941.00. 
The amounts owing to the Defendant are to be offset against 
those amounts owing to the Plaintiff. 
The net amount due to the Plaintiff shall bear interest at 
the statutory rate for judgments from the date of the initial 
judgment in this matter. 
DATED this /£ " day of W ^ ^ ^ - , 2000. 
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BY THE COURT 
y ij t 7 ^^^ • 
Honorable Robert K. Hilde: 
Third Districc Judae 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Amended Judgment, by United States 
mail, postage prepaid, this ~7 > day of June, 2000, to the 
following counsel of record for plaintiff John B. Hawkins: 
Shawn D. Turner 
4516 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS 
Copr. © West Group 2000. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 10-1-2000. 
RULE 4. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN 
(a) Appeal From Final Judgment and Order. In a case in wh • • 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court n , ^ 3 P P e a l i s 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 L l be filed w U h t h ' e ^ ' ^ C O U r t' t h e 
court within 30 days after the date of entrv 1 h e C l e r k o f t h e trial 
from. However, whe'n a judgmentIr'order s^enle ed n ^ t a ^ o ^ f ^ ^ 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of anneal rtn / I f°rcible 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court w S ' n i T d " *? ^  3 
of entry of the judgment or order appealed from! ° a / S a r t e r t h e d a t e 
o^i^J^l SITE Z r ^ f coS^ "i^Tv?utah ~~ 
S " ^ ^^-Hi^^£ SSL" ~ " — ~ -
m 0 t l O n l s
 granted; (3) under Rule 59 to altV or Lend ^ ^ ^ i f t h e 
unoer Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for ^ e a l f o r all ^ S ^ ' " . 0f <4) 
r.om the entry of the order denying a new trial or ar*nliLP J* ShaU r U n 
other such motion Similarly i*
 a n m a l granting or denying any 
Criminal Procedure is fn^i in\\ I ^ Itl°tl°n " ^ C h e U t a h ^es of 
the time formal 1
 0 r* f ^ tiL^a^l^frf ^ ^ '' f°r * n e w trial, 
aenying a new trial. A notlc^f appeal fil™
 r ^ ^ °
f
 •** °
r d e r 
the above motions shall have no effect A new -
 f disposition of any of 
within the prescribed time measured from the ent^v of I " " ^ m U S t b e f i l e d 
court disposing of the motion as provided above " ^ ° r d e r ° f t h e t r i a l 
ParJgra^nlbVol^hi: *£? f ™ ^ or Order. Except as provided in 
t ^ T 5 ~ " ^ ^ ^ r ^ J ^ ^ l f j announcement of 
the trxal court shall be treated as filed after sucVentrv" S ^ t h ^ f " ^ 
(e) Extension of Time to Appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of 
appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the 
time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before 
expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court 
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the 
prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the 
rules of practice of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past 
Copr. © West 2000 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
UT R RAP Rule 4 Page 3 
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the 
motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in 
an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal 
case, the notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in tne 
institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. 
Timely filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration 
setting forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage has been 
prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the manner provided in tnis 
paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in paragraph a) runs from the date 
when the trial court receives the first notice of appeal. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999. 
Rules App. Proc, Rule 4 
UT R RAP Rule 4 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART II. COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE OF PROCESS, PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND 
ORDERS 
Copr. © West Group 2000. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 10-1-2000. 
RULE 5. SERVICE AND FILING OF PLEADINGS AND OTHER PAPERS 
(a) Service: When Required. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise directed by 
the court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be served, 
every pleading subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to 
discovery, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper 
shall be served upon each of the parties. 
(2) No service need be made on parties in default for failure to appear 
except as provided in Rule 55 (a) (2) (default proceedings). Pleadings asserting 
new or additional claims for relief against a party in default shall be served 
in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
(3) In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, 
attachment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is 
named as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an 
answer, claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or 
possession of the property at the time of its seizure. 
(b) Service: How Made and by Whom. 
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made 
upon a party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the 
attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court. Service upon 
the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy or by mailing a 
copy to the last known address or, if no address is known, by leaving it with 
the clerk of the court. 
(A) Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney 
or to the party; or leaving it at the person's office with a clerk or person 
in charge thereof; or, if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a 
conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to be 
served has no office, leaving it at the person's dwelling house or usual 
place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing 
therein. 
(B) Service by mail is complete upon mailing. If the paper served is notice 
of a hearing and if the hearing is scheduled 5 days or less from the date of 
service, service shall be by delivery or other method of actual notice. 
(2) Unless otherwise directed by the court: 
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UT R RCP Rule 5 Page 3 
(A) an order signed by the court and required by its terms to be served or 
a judgment signed by the court shall be served by the party preparing it; 
(B) every other pleading or paper required by this rule to be served shall 
be served by the party preparing it; and 
(C) an order or judgment prepared by the court shall be served by the 
court. 
(c) Service: Numerous Defendants. In any action in which there is an 
unusually large number of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own 
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and 
replies thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any cross-
claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense 
contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other parties 
and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the plaintiff 
constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order shall 
be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs. 
(d) Filing. Except where rules of judicial administration prohibit the filing 
of discovery requests and responses, all papers after the complaint required to 
be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before or within a 
reasonable time after service. The papers shall be accompanied by a certificate 
of service showing the date and manner of service completed by the person 
effecting service. 
(e) Filing With the Court Defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers 
with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with the 
clerk of the court, except that the judge may accept the papers, note thereon 
the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1997; April 1, 1999.] 
Advisory Committee Notes 
The 1999 amendment to subdivision (b)(1)(B) does not authorize the court to 
conduct a hearing with less than 5 days notice, but rather specifies the 
manner of service of the notice when the court otherwise has that authority. 
1997 note: Rule 5(d) is amended to give the trial court the option, either 
on an ad hoc basis or by local rule, of ordering that discovery papers, 
depositions, written interrogatories, document requests, requests for 
admission, and answers and responses need not be filed unless required for 
specific use in the case. The committee is of the view that a local rule of 
the district courts on the subject should be encouraged. 
Rules Civ. Proc, Rule 5 
UT R RCP Rule 5 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART V. DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY 
Copr. © West Group 2000. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 10-1-2000. 
RULE 36. REQUEST FOR ADMISSION 
(a) Request for Admission. 
(1) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the 
admission, for purpose of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters 
within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to 
statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including 
the genuineness of any documents described in the request. The request for 
admission shall contain a notice advising the party to whom the request is made 
that, pursuant to Rule 36, the matters shall be deemed admitted unless said 
request is responded to within 30 days after service of the request or within 
such shorter or longer time as the court may allow. Copies of documents shall 
be served with the request unless they have been or are otherwise furnished or 
made available for inspection and copying. Without leave of court or written 
stipulation, requests for admission may not be served before the time specified 
in Rule 26 (d) . 
(2) Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set 
forth. The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the 
request, or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the 
party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the 
admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the 
party or by his attorney, but, unless the court shortens the time, a defendant 
shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the expiration of 
4 5 days after service of the summons and complaint upon him. If objection is 
made, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The answer shall specifically deny 
the matter or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot 
truthfully admit or deny the matter. A denial shall fairly meet the substance 
of the requested admission, and when good faith requires that a party qualify 
his answer or deny only a part of the matter of which an admission is 
requested, he shall specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the 
remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as 
a reason for failure to admit or deny unless he states that he has made 
reasonable inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable by him 
is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny. A party who considers that a 
matter of which an admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for 
trial may not, on that ground alone, object to the request; he may, subject to 
the provisions of Rule 37(c), deny the matter or set forth reasons why he 
cannot admit or deny it. 
(3) The party who has requested the admissions may move to determine the 
sufficiency of the answers or objections. Unless the court determines that an 
objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court 
determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this rule, 
it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be 
served. The court may, in lieu of these orders, determine that final 
disposition of the request be made at a pretrial conference or at a designated 
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time prior to trial. The provisions of Rule 37(a) (4) apply to the award of 
expenses incurred in relation to the motion. 
(b) Effect of Admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively 
established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the 
admission. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment or a 
pretrial order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or 
amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the 
merits. Any admission made by a party under this rule is for the purpose of the 
pending action only and is not an admission by him for any other purpose nor 
y it be used against him in any other proceeding. 
ma\ 
[Amended effective November 1, 1999.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
For a complete explanation of the 1999 amendments to this rule and the 
interrelationship of these amendments with the other discovery changes see 
the advisory committee note appended to Rule 26. The Supreme Court order 
aooroving the amendments directed that the new procedures be applicable on.y 
to' cases filed on or after November 1, 1999. 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
Copr. © West Group 2000. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 10-1-2000. 
RULE 59. NEW TRIALS; AMENDMENTS OF JUDGMENT 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any 
of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial 
in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has 
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions 
of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or 
any order of tne court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have 
been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on 
any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by 
cnance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the 
affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, 
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at 
the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 
10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by 
afridavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they 
shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such 
service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the 
arridavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an 
additional period not exceeding 20 days eitr.er by the court for aocd cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit recly 
affidavits. 
Copr. © West 2000 No Claim to Oris. U.S. Govt. Works 
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(d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which 
it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judament. 
Rules Civ. Proc, Rule 59 
UT R RCP Rule 59 
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WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. JUDGMENT 
Copr. © West Group 2000. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments received through 10-1-2000. 
RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may 
be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; 
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time 
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule 
does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment 
for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
[Amended effective April 1, 1998.] 
Advisory Committee Note 
The 1998 amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion the following: "(4) 
when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served 
upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to 
appear in said action." This basis for a motion is not found in the federal 
rule. The committee concluded the clause was ambiguous and possibly in 
conflict with rules permitting service by means other than personal service. 
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JOHN 3. HAWKINS, 
plaintiff herein, called to testify on 
his own behalf, being first duly sworn, 
was examined and testified on his oath as 
follows: 
MR. TURNER: Your Honor, as a preliminary matter, 
I have a number of exhibits that I'm going to introduce 
through this witness. May I have the Court's permission to 
approach the witness? 
THE COURT: Yes. That's no problem. 
MR. TURNER: I've also made courtesy copies of 
those for the Court and Counsel. I've given him his. May I 
approach? 
THE COURT: You may. Thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. TURNER: 
Q. Mr. Hawkins, will you please state your full name 
and current address for the record. 
A. John Browning Hawkins. And my address is 14 2 7 
East Sherman Avenue in Salt Lake City, 34105. 
Q. And, Mr. Hawkins, are you formerly the owner of 
the property located at 61 West Russett Avenue in Salt Lake 
City? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. A.nd about when did you buy that property? 
i 20 
A. It was abouc three, maybe three and a half years 
ago. 
Q. And what was the purpose of buying the property? 
A. The purpose was co move out of my parents' house 
and have a place to live. 
Q. And about how many bedrooms were there in that 
house? 
A.. There were two. 
Q. And at the time you moved into the home, was 
anybody else living there with you? 
A. Initially, when I moved in, I moved in for a month 
and I did some work on the hardwood floors. And then after 
that, my sister moved in wich me. 
Q. And did you subsequently take in renters into the 
property? 
A. I didn't until about six months later. When I 
finished one of the rooms downstairs, I did. I nook in a 
renter after that. 
Q. Okay. And so was that to act as another bedroom? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. And how many bedrooms, by the time you sold the 
property, had you finished in the house? 
A. I had finished two of them. 
Q. So how many bedrooms were there total? 
A. Four bedrooms. 
21 
1 | person. He wasn't there at the time that I delivered them. 
2 I Q. Did you ever discuss this with Tom Callahan? 
3 I A. No. I didn't discuss this, hut he said that he 
4 was planning to move out and that he had some prospects, 
5 l that he was looking for a place. 
5 Q. And when was that? 
7 A. That would have been -- I think that would have 
been the beginning of March. 
Q. Okay. Was that around the time that you had 
discussed the extension? 
A. No. That should have been before. 
Q. Which would have --
9 
10 
11 
12 
A. The extension should have -- he talked about tha 
before -- before we talked about him moving out. 
Q. Okay. So after you told him he couldn't extend, 
he told ycu that he was planning on moving out, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
18 I Q. Now, from the time that he told you that he 
•jg planned on moving out until the time that he moved out, did 
2o you ever see any signs that Mr. Callahan was trying to move 
out? 
A. No. Not other than his verbal comments that he 
was trying to find a place. 
Q. During that time, did you ever have any verbal 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 I a l t e r c a t i o n s or any other a l t e r ca t i ons with Mr. Callahan? 
A. Any verbal altercations? What do you mean by 
that? 
Q. Did Mr. Callahan ever threaten you? 
A. Yes. There was actually two times. One time was 
when I was working on my home. I was painting Henry 
Bowman's room that's upstairs just above Tom's room. And I 
was pulling out his telephone line because he had a separate 
telephone line. A.nd I pulled that out and I was proceedina 
to tape along the floor, and I heard some yelling and 
screaming, and Tom came upstairs and was waiving his arms 
around and yelling and screaming. I couldn't even 
understand what he was saying. And I stood up and walked 
over and I tried to ask him, you know, what was wrong. 
And after a minute or two later, you know, he said 
his phone didn't work and he said it was all my fault. and 
I went into the kitchen and picked up the phone and the 
phone worked, and it -- you know, it didn't --at that time, 
you know, I didn't think of, you know, his phone wasn't 
working downstairs. 
And after, you know, we talked about that, I went 
downstairs and I guess the phone didn't work downstairs. 
Then I went out to the phone box and I couldn't see anythina 
going on there, and then when I went back in the house, mv 
girlfriend was in the closet in that same room and my 
adrenalin was going, and she said she felt scared, and I 
40 
was, like, well, yeah, that -- I felt scared LOO. SO I 
called the police and I had them come over at that time and, 
you know, talk with Tom about his behavior. 
Q. And you said there were two occasions. What was 
the other? 
A. The other occasion was when we came in the back 
door because the front door was locked. I don't have a key 
to the deadbolt, so we came around the back. And as we came 
m , I heard something in the basement that seemed like 
running water. So I went downstairs. And the washer was 
flooding over because the door was open. And I put down 
the -- the door and it stopped, and after that, I talked to 
my girlfriend. I told her I was going to go home to cet my 
camera to take some pictures. And after I did that, I came 
back and then I proceeded to work on my house after I could 
clean up some of the water, because --in the bathroom and 
then, you know, the door was locked to Tom's room, so I 
couldn't really clean up anything else. So I proceeded to 
work on my home upstairs. I was doing some taping and 
working on my bathroom up there. 
And Dan came home and I asked him about it, asked, 
you know, if he had anything to do with the washer, and he 
told me no, that he, you know, woke up at 6:00 a.m. and went 
to work and that he hadn't been there. 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 
Mr. Hawkins, can you tell me what that is? 
This is a three-day notice 
served to Tom on June the 15th 
Okay. And why was it that 
three-day notice on June 15th? 
to pay rent or 
of '98. 
you were deliv 
vacate 
er: 
-
n9 
i 
4 2 
A. Well, I served him --
MR. ROUNDY: Objection, Your Honor. This runs 
contrary to the request for admission again. 
MR. TURNER: And, Your Honor --
MR. ROUNDY: There's a couple of them. The one 
that talks about the fact that he has in fact paid the rent 
and then another which indicates the purpose of his eviction 
was the purpose of -- that he wanted to move out, not to try 
to collect this deposit:. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to allow it subject 
to your objection. It will depend on my other rulings 
whether it is indeed relevant:. Okay? 
MR. ROUNDY: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. TURNER: Your Honor, I'd like to make one 
brief statement with respect to the issue of what the 
purpose of the eviction was. That may have been a puroose, 
out that doesn't mean that that can be the sole purpose o^ " 
the sole reason that those --
THE COURT: That's fine. Keep that for argument as to 
the relevance. 
MR. TURNER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q. Okay. Mr. Hawkins, this particular document was 
being delivered on June 15th why? I'm sorry, I don't 
remember your answer. 
A. I delivered it co him because the second time zha 
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washer flooded over, the first time I did get an insurance 
settlement, but the second time I felt like he, you know, 
didn't really care about: the property or where he lived and 
that he didn't want to pay the deposit and he felt like, you 
know, he could cause any damage chat he wanted to at that 
point. 
Q. So at the time you delivered this, it was your 
understanding and belief that he had not paid the remaining 
$150 of his deposit; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And would June 15th have also been the day that 
the rent for the next month was due? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And did Mr. Callahan ever offer to pay you that 
next month's rent? 
A. On June 15th, no, I don't think he did. 
Q. Okay. But, subsequently, he tendered you a 
cashier's check for the month of June to July, right? 
A. Yes.' That's correct. That would have been after 
the fact. That would have been, probably, five -- five days 
later. 
Q. Okay. When he tendered that check, did he offer 
to pay the rest of the deposit? 
A. No, he did not. 
Q. Did you accept that check? 
A. That check, I did not accept. 
Q. Let me show you what's been marked as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 7. Can you cell us what that is? 
A. This is an eviction notice that was served the 
same day, June 15th, '98. 
Q. Okay. And what is the basis for serving this 
particular eviction notice? 
A. The basis was that he threatened me and I felt 
unsafe being there at the home. 
Q. Okay. Looking at the three criteria in the middle 
there, are those in your handwriting? 
A. Yes, they are. 
Q. Okay. At the time you filled this out, did you 
feel that Mr. Callahan broke all three of those rules? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Turning back for a minute, can you go back to 
Exhibit No. 1? Now, comparing that with your Exhibit No. 7 
the first item you've listed as breaking rule No. 7, no 
smoking in the house or your bathroom, how does that fit 
into rule No. 7? 
A. When we negotiated the contract, in the ad that I 
placed it said "no smoking," and Tom said he smoked, so we 
agreed that there would be no smoking in the house. A.nd h° 
said he would smoke outside. So we came to aoreement that 
the no smokmc was a rule. 
Q. Okay. 
MR. ROUNDY: Objection, Your Honor. This is 
contrary to the written terms of the lease that were merged 
into the lease and his oral testimony about other things 
than he agreed to verbally. It's not admissible as 
evidence. 
THE COURT: Why would I allow that, Mr. Turner? 
MR. TURNER: I've got a follow-up question, Your 
Honor, where I think that becomes clear. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'll allow that question 
subject to the objection. Go ahead. 
Q. (By Mr. Turner) Looking at: rule 7 of the house 
rules which is on the --on the lease agreement:, correct? 
A. Uh-huh. Yes. 
Q. Was it your understanding that the language in the 
third line down of that which -- relating to odors dealt 
with cigarette smoking? 
A. Yes, that is correct. 
Q. So it was your understanding that, under the 
express terms of the lease, that no smoking was allowed in 
the home? 
A. That is correct. 
MR. ROUNDY: Objection, Your Honor. I don't see 
where this interpretation can come from. It says that there 
might be some rules that relate to odors, but it doesn't say 
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A. Okay. 
Q. Have you seen that document before? 
A. I have. 
Q. And what is it? 
A. It's a copy of the lease agreement. 
Q. And who is that lease agreement between? 
A. John Hawkins and I. 
Q. Okay. And where have you seen that document 
before? 
A. I had it at one time. 
Q. And did you give a copy of that :o Mr. Hawkins? 
A. I gave it -- I gave the copy to him, the copy that 
I had to him. 
Q. Okay. And was chat the sole lease agreement 
between you and Mr. Hawkins for this property? 
A. Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) 
Q. Okay. Now, as you recall the terms of your lease 
agreement, was Mr. Hawkins to provide you with cable 
television? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Mr. Hawkins ever provide you with cable 
television? 
A. Huh-uh. (Negative.) 
Q. Who was supposed to provide the normal utilities, 
like electricity and cas and water? 
Q. Did you see these come sliding under the door when 
you were in the room? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay. Thanks. 
Torn, when was the last day that you actually 
stayed in the premises at 61 West Russett Avenue? 
A. I think it was August 16th. It was on a Sunday. 
I didn't actually stay there that night. I was out for 
the... 
THE COURT: I didn't hear that date, I'm sorry. 
August what? 
THE WITNESS: I -- I think I -- it should be down 
there some place. It's -- I chink it's August 16th. 
THE COURT: August 16th. Thank you. 
Q. (By Mr. Roundy) Of 1993; is that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. I'd like to show you a document which we'll 
mark as Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, if we may. 
MR. ROUNDY: If I could approach the bench. 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. 
Q. (By Mr. Roundy) All right. Tom, this is a 
document. I want to ask you if you recognize it. 
A. It looks like the document of the constable's 
office. 
Q. Okay. And did you ever receive this document? 
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 Q -p ^ n c c < it n* im- I « - ' • " • • " • mc r * T c r - i c i - ^ — cr _ / - n t r g v a p i f j n f i i f " e« dent nas eft p e s -
n i ^ j ^ a r l n ^ " f C " r , , ' ' ' m ' , / , * r r ' " > ; > n C ' ' ' l r ( j - *m"t o ^ / ' ^ - ' r ^ " no i C ' d ^ i ' 3C en T e ' i O ' l t "13V Ofc 
j o v 1/ -y 0 - «n ^ n ) 1 n d J ? f ' " ' 5 I " r , r r i » l c - - . n rcc - / *. «! n 20
 Cz,- - f to c- C - " * r - a y -na^ 
- 1 O ac * - C I O - * ! *"* p PC* / 3 t ' J ' ^ ^ " * / 3 J"J^r
 o C " < nr« p - ^ - . ^ , o - a r c a n , ar-cunt ^ * ^ ' dent 1 3 / C - ' / 
™ C n * , , ^ a / n g a< C .uC^ a^  on a.« - 1 ZC .1 01 n K ' C O n c ^ ^ I - U C . > . 4 ng . 
, 5 ^ , ^ j m ^ 0 J . . . . * j " i c » Cr OC'** n«-
l - W N ' O R f " 1 * lollOv* nc fum - n g i a n d n ^ -nior/ Ar <•
 3 , r - / •» ., j g r , - ^ , n 
MC C C ' l o l * C ^ S 
ADDENDUM "F" 
This is notification that this house will be put up for seil and ail renters need to be 
moved out by June 14. For reimbursement of your deposit the house and yard need to be 
clean and your belongings cleared. If you have any questions call me at 532 7895 
JOHN HAWKINS 
DATE 5-1-98 
FOR 61 WEST RUSSETT AVE. 
SLC, UT 84115 
I 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
ADDENDUM "G" 
THREE-DAY NOTICE TO PAY RENT OR VACATE 
TO: 
ie nant in Possession 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
-( r- ?5 r r ' Address 7" 
-/ 
o O 
o <=-
g «• . / J . ^ o O e " ? i r l [ o , the peno „ , j ^ £ -
per month amounting to the total sum of S K0,o~ , , ^ s ' - " J ^ " _ J . "••= or 
account of the rent thus accrued and u m ^ ^ ' ^ ^ ' " ' , & , 
DAYS °ro VACATE a^m^U<QV7v^^- "&?^&&ot%si?^\' 
IN THE EVENT of your f a i l u re to pay the said rent or vacat* the said premises 
w . J n n sucn period of THREE DAYS, you w i l l be unlawful ly d - t a i n i n I DO session 
o.
 fsaid p r e s s e s , and in accordance w i th the provisions of Se' t on 7 8 " I n V . h 
Cono Annnf-^fn^ inco . •-n r T-
 tn \ . oection / o - J o - i u , Utah 
i i ° V r ' *?? K 1 1 b e l l 3 5 l e f ° r t r e D l s d a m a ? e s f o j " such unlawful 
ano o tak t l " b f c o « n n ? n c e ^ a 9 a i n ; t * ° " to ev ic t you from said premises 
ana to ta<e judgment against you tor the rent accrued and for thre» times the 
? e g a i e : c a t ? o " S e d ^ ^ C ° U r t f 0 P U n l 2 W f U l d e t a i n S f » t 0 ^ S t h - w i t ' t h e costs of 
r , - T n i L n ^ t i c e i s g 1 v e n a n d s e r v s d i n e c c o rdance wi th the provisions of 
Section 73-36-3 and Section 78-36-6, Utah Cede Annotated, 1953? 
Dated th is day of A.D. 1 9 ^ i t -
Section 156 of the Ordinances of Salt Lake C i t v , Utah 
provides: " J ' 
t sna i l be unlawful fo r any person, upon vacating 
any other 
C l
' t y , Utah, to f a i l 
s torp rnr-nc nr- - , „*u L . , J : " r ; " , " : : . ' . " - o r renovina from d w s l i i n c s , 
 l i t C " y ? L h f r t b u l l d l n 9 s] u a t e d W l f cnm the corporate l i m i t s of Sa l t 
bu I d i r a ; n H n ' -° f 1/V^ a 1 1 Oaroage, rubbish and ashes from such 
pi Ho
 s L p - n P r e T : S 8 S *?* a l s ° - n e 9 P C U " d ^ P P ^ i n i n g thereto, or to f a i l to p ia .e sane in a thorouanlv sani tary condit ion 24 hour< 
be vacated". "3 a f ter said premises s h a l l 
1 > Mi-v Z/ / a t - £ 5>ft, 'c C? 
^ ^>K9 c*jr>' -7"5 v^o-f: 
/ u />7 Qa/'ctk £>^v 
yr //? 
ADDENDUM "H" 
Eviction No tice 
TIIUEE-DAY NOTICB TO VACATE 
(NUISANCE) 
EXHIBIT 
7 
To: 
SU Uf ^ | j < 
WITHIN THREE DAYS a f t e r s e r v i c e of t h i s n o t i c e upon you, you 
a r e r e q u i r e d to v a c a t e the p r e m i s e s a t the above a d d r e s s , which premises 
Xou now occupy
 Q 3 a t e n a n t of the u n d e r s i g n e d for the r ea son tha t ycu have 
e r e d , p e r m i t t e d o r m a i n t a i n e d a n u i s a n c e on or about the s a i d p remises , 
t o - w i t : _ _ A ^ V fad? it 3- A7O ^ yivkA<Lj«_TU. / / L C / 
n.-;i1i,A\^rriv-^ n 
P 
-^—
J
^XliKd Dnku ftrra^ r}rr,n_J_ 
In the e v e n t of your f a i l u r e to v a c a t e the s a i d premises w i th in 
such
 p e r i 0 d of THREE DAYS you w i l l be deemed g u i l t y of an unlawful r e t a i n e r 
and l e g a l
 a c t i o n w i u b e i n i t i a t e d 3 g a i n s t y c u f o r r e s t i t u t i o n of the p r e -
s s e s and for t h r = „ t i r n e 3 t h e d a i a 3 g „ a 3 3 C 3 3 e d a g a i n 3 t y o u i n a c „ r d a n c . 
>'ith t h e p r o v i s i o n of S e c t i o n 7 3 - 3 6 - 1 0 , Utah Code Annota ted , 1 9 S 3 . ' 
1 1 , 1 3
 f ' o t i c a i s g iven and s c r / e d i n accordance wi th the p rov i s i c i l 3 
of S e c t i o n 7fl-3G-3(<l) and S e c t i o n 73 -36 -6 , Utah Code A;::;c-tated, 1953 / 
Dated t h i s iC ,\nY of '^)UnP 19_23. 
